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Abstract 
 This project analyzes the 514 foreign investments made by Chinese SOEs between 
January 2005 and December 2015 and considers their effects on market competitiveness as 
measured by country-and-industry-level HHI. The results describe how the investment volume 
and Chinese government stake in an SOE significantly affect HHI, but the other tested measures 
of Chinese state influence do not. These findings reflect the confirmed legal advantages and 
prevalent M&A behavior adopted by SOEs in virtue of them being vessels for CCP foreign 
policy. Prospective recipient countries may extrapolate conclusions to limit the type or size of 
Chinese SOE investments given this information. To further confirm the validity of these results, 
alternative indicators for market competitiveness and state control over SOEs ought to be 
explored. Additional exploration into this subject area could investigate the effects of Chinese 
SOE investments from other lenses, for instance, considering if the investments are justified 
based on their expected rates of return.  
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 Despite numerous predictions that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would not survive, 
Chinese SOEs continued to rise globally with a business strategy predicated on outward 
investments and reliance on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resources. What originated as 
entities offering public services to Chinese citizens evolved into multinational mega-corporations 
dominating core industries, including energy and construction, globally. Theoretically, deals 
entered by these companies should be beneficial for both China and recipient countries; 
otherwise, there would be no reason for both parties to continue entering these transactions. 
Despite this ideal, international concern about ulterior geostrategic and economic motives has 
accompanied the rapid global emergence of Chinese SOEs in recent years. Scholars have argued 
that CCP influence has had overwhelming positive effects on efficiency within the state-owned 
companies and the Chinese economy overall, but it is unclear if these benefits extend beyond 
China.  
Much literature has analyzed the investment patterns of Chinese SOEs and how they 
fueled China’s modern economic growth. However, an underexplored aspect of these companies 
and their investments is how they affect markets of recipient countries. This dimension is 
particularly relevant for understanding the broader effects of China’s ongoing foreign policy 
endeavors. As China embarks on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—arguably its most 
ambitious and far-reaching investment project in history—with SOEs leading the charge, 
potential economic effects on industries in different countries ought to be examined in greater 
detail. This project analyzes the foreign investments of Chinese SOEs to understand the effect 
these transactions have on market competitiveness globally. A comprehensive examination of 
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these companies from a diversified set of industries assists in dissecting the incremental results 




SOEs, also referred to as government-owned corporations (GOCs), are companies that 
are partially or fully owned or operated by a national, regional, or local government. They 
originated in Europe to create natural monopolies that promoted societal wellbeing (International 
Monetary Fund, 2020). The free market could not effectively provide services like utilities or 
healthcare, but there also was not sufficient public funding to guarantee them in the long-term, so 
a middle ground needed to be found. An SOE offered a solution for both issues. They could be 
started with the public funding that was available, but they would be operated with profitability 
as a core goal, like that of a private business. In struggling years, they could be assisted by the 
government, and in profitable years, they would increase government revenue and SOE 
shareholder wealth (Peng et al., 2016).  
The emergence of these companies came with an emergence of critics. Leading the 
charge, János Kornai argued that these companies and “market socialism” more generally—
where markets exist but state-owned firms comprise a large share of a state’s economy—were 
untenable. To him, a society that sat halfway between socialism and capitalism would reap the 
benefits of neither system and eventually implode on itself (Kornai, 2007). Other scholars joined 
in his line of logic, arguing that the line between public and private should not be traversed.  
SOEs tended to be less efficiently run due to the nature of bureaucratic governmental systems 
 
1 For reference, a glossary of acronyms and initialisms defined and used throughout this paper can be found in 
Appendix 1. A glossary of terms can be found in Appendix 2.  
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and the presence of a cushion if the company underperformed (Milhaupt and Pargendler, 2017). 
However, because they were fundamentally for-profit, they needed to charge higher than 
expected prices to stay afloat. They could offer neither the profitability and operational 
excellence of a private company nor the expansiveness and affordability of a government service 
(Kornai, 2007).  
This corporate structure remains prevalent today, with over 2,197 being reported in 
OECD countries alone as of 2012 (OECD.org, n.d.). Collectively, these companies are valued at 
over $2 trillion USD, have over 6 million employees, and contribute to around 10% of global 
GDP (OECD.org, n.d.; Bruton et al., 2015). With subsidies and legal exemptions, SOEs fly 
above market principles that ground purely private businesses. They are given exclusive 
financing rates, subsidies, resources, and tax advantages which help them outcompete other 
companies in the acquisition bidding process (Grimsditch, 2015; Heng 2014). Additionally, they 
have the financial backing of the state to support them through unprofitable years and protect 
them from the complications of bankruptcy (Grimsditch, 2015). Operationally, they are also 
easier to scale given the expansive networks and geographical locations that state agencies have 
access to and are familiar with (International Monetary Fund, 2020).  
 
The History of Chinese SOEs 
 Chinese SOEs were formed in 1949 in conjunction with the People’s Republic of China 
to provide essential services and rebuild the disaster-torn country (Gang and Hope, 2013). As 
predicted by Kornai, these companies faced a series of problems due to their corporate structure. 
They struggled with to produce steady income after accounting for a laundry list of expenses but 
continued to be propped up by state resources. The SOEs also harmed the private business 
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landscape within China. Private businesses did not have the advantage of government backing to 
support them in times of unprofitability. Until 1978, SOEs were the predominant corporate 
structure of Chinese companies (Grimsditch et al., 2015). 
Beginning in 1978, the Deng Xiaoping regime introduced free market principles, 
requiring them to undergo a series of sweeping reforms (Lin et al., 2020; Heng, 2014). The 
common business ways of SOEs shifted during this period. The focus on profitability took a 
front seat as the companies embarked on lucrative opportunities abroad. SOEs undertook 
unprecedented amounts of debt, increasing average leverage ratios from a reasonable 18.7% to 
an alarming 79% between 1980 and 1994 (Wu, 1999). The support of the Chinese government 
initially allowed them to take greater risks to realize greater returns. Former SASAC Chairman, 
Li Rongrong analogized that state funding was the blood pumping through the “vital arteries” of 
the Chinese economy (Dobson, 2014). However, managers in these companies lacked 
accountability. They were granted autonomy with no supervisors to report to, allowing 
corruption and mismanagement to run rampant (Heng, 2014; Chen, 2013). Resultantly, over 
238,000 of the SOEs, more than two-thirds of all in operation, recorded net losses in 1998 
(Ralston et al., 2006).  
In 2003, the State Assets Supervision and Advisory Committee (SASAC) of the State 
Council had been established to oversee the functions of the SOEs deemed central to China (The 
World Bank and Development Research Center of the People’s Republic China State Council, 
2012). The least profitable SOEs were either permanently closed, merged, or acquired by local 
municipalities or more profitable SOEs (Heng, 2014; Lin et al., 2020). These consolidations and 
restructurings significantly reduced the average amount of debt held by these companies and 
increased the percentage of profitability across them (Heng, 2014). The corporatization of these 
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entities also furthered their involvement in China’s internationalization plan that began in 2000 
(OECD.org, 2009).  
Chinese SOEs became unique in their reliance on foreign business. In 2020, over 60% of 
Chinese SOE revenue was obtained overseas, as opposed to 0% in 1949 (Wang, 2021). In 2013 
alone, the combined value of all Chinese overseas investments surpassed $107.84 billion USD 
(Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics and State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, 2014). In all other countries, the vast majority of outward investments are made by 
completely private companies (Huang and Wang, 2011). Meanwhile, beginning in 2009, SOE 
investments comprised over 70% of all outward investments from China (Huang and Wang, 
2011). Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) were a common deployment of these investments. 
China arose as a “national strategic buyer”, completing over $96 billion in M&A transactions in 
2016 alone (Gordon and Milhaupt, 2018).  
Between their inception and the current day, the goal of many SOEs transformed from 
providing accessible, essential services for the Chinese public to maximizing profit and 
furthering state interests internationally. This strategy is responsible for Chinese SOEs’ rise to 
prominence. Of the 204 largest SOEs listed in the 2012 Forbes Global 2000 list, 70 were 
Chinese, with India at 30 being the next largest player (Kowalski et al., 2013). All four Chinese 
state-owned banks ranked within the ten largest public companies in the 2020 Forbes Global 
2000 list, and for the eighth consecutive year, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 




Modern CCP Influence Over Chinese SOEs 
Embedded in the functioning of SOEs is allegiance to the CCP. The reform of SOEs was 
partially driven by domestic economic motives like achieving operational excellence, but, in 
part, it was also motivated by the desire to align companies with CCP goals. SOE reform remains 
a continuous process of blurring lines between the CCP and Chinese businesses. In 2015, the 
CCP General Committee and the State Council released a guidance for SOEs which explains 
that:  
“…adhering to the [CCP]’s leadership over SOEs is the political direction 
and principle when deepening the reform of SOEs. It is necessary to 
implement the principle about overall strict governance of the Party, to 
[fully] play to the political core role of the Party organization in companies, 
to strengthen the construction of the leading group in companies, to 
innovate the work of [Party] building at the primary level, to deepen the 
construction of a clean and honest Party, to wholeheartedly rely on the 
working class, to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of employees, 
and to provide a strong political and organizational guarantee and human 
resource support for the reform and development in SOEs.”2 
 
The covered topics were focused on domestic issues such as fostering patriotism and 
support for employees. These tactics emphasize employee identification with the CCP, 
strengthening its influence from within companies themselves. Wording like “to wholeheartedly 
rely on the working class” puts the onus on employees to fulfill CCP goals like “implement[ing] 
 
2 This translation was copied from Lu and Zhu (2020). Brackets were added for clarity and consistency.  
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the principle about overall strict governance of the Party”. However, the guidance deployed 
wording like “innovate the work of [Party] building” that can be construed ambiguously to 
maintain the guise of autonomy within SOEs (Lu and Zhu, 2020). It does not explicitly give 
direct instructions for how these goals will be achieved or allude to the nature of SOE expansion 
over the previous decades.  
In the following years, SOEs were more openly utilized to further geostrategic moves for 
the CCP, following themes of how the CCP deploys authoritarian control over most crucial 
aspects of China. However, these efforts have never been as brazen. A 2017 guidance read:  
“…it is the unique advantage of SOEs to insist on the [CCP]’s leadership 
and to strengthen the Party building. It is necessary to clarify the legal status 
of the Party organization in the corporate governance structure of SOEs, to 
incorporate the general requirements of the Party building in the regulations 
of SOEs, and to clarify the rights, responsibilities and working methods of 
the Party organization in the decision-making, implementation and 
supervision processes, so as to make the Party organization an integral part 
of the corporate governance structure. In addition, it is essential to [give] 
full play to the [leading political role] of the Party, to lead the ideological 
and political work of the companies, to support board of directors, board of 
supervisors and management to perform their duties in accordance with the 
law, and to ensure the implementation of the [Party’s] national policies” 3 
It continues:  
 
3 This translation was copied from Lu and Zhu (2020). Brackets were added for clarity and consistency. 
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“…the Party members among directors, supervisors, and management team 
of SOEs shall regularly report to the Party group (Party committee) about 
the performance of their duties, integrity and self-discipline every year… 
[and] actively explore the ways and methods of the organic combination 
between the principle of the Party’s managing cadres and board’s selection 
and appointment of management personnel. By insist on and improving the 
leadership system of two-way entry and cross appointment, qualified 
members of the Party group (Party committee) in SOEs can be a member of 
the board of directors, board of supervisors and management through legal 
procedures. Qualified members of board of directors, board of supervisors 
and management are able to enter the Party group (Party committee) 
according to relevant regulations and procedures; the position of secretary 
of the Party group (Party committee) and chairman of board of directors 
should be taken by the same person generally and promote the project about 
appointing the Deputy Secretary of the Party group (Party committee) as a 
member of board of directors in centrally-administered SOEs.” 4  
The first passage describes the general structures the CCP expects SOEs to implement while the 
second passage clarifies specific directives for their goals. These passages establish a strong 
allegiance to the party that is reinforced with both supervision and weight on “self-discipline.” In 
addition to securing profit, SOEs must allow “full play to the [leading political role] of the 
party,” “ensure the implementation of the [Party’s] national policies,” and create a CCP 
committee that is “an integral part of [its] corporate governance structure.” From the laws and 
 
4 This translation was copied from Lu and Zhu (2020). Ellipses and brackets were added for efficiency. 
10 
 
regulations to the boards of companies themselves, the CCP has been gradually expanding its 
circle of influence over SOEs and the goals of SOEs themselves. In exchange for compliance 
with these guidances, the CCP offers even more preferential treatment for the most loyal 
companies. SOEs are already given advantages from the Chinese government, for instance, a 
functionally unlimited line of credit and exclusive access to governmental resources (Dorn, 
2015). These guidelines further increase the gap between private businesses and SOEs, allowing 
them to deploy their capital even more effectively in comparison. 
 Recently, in the face of international critics, President Xi Jinping has also shamelessly 
embraced SOEs under the condition that they would continue to allow the expansion of CCP 
control over them (Buckley and Bradsher, 2020). He approved a three-year plan, effective July 
2020, that would even further augment the role SOEs play in the global economy (Tang, 2020). 
The action plan, with endorsement from the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms 
Commission, argued that the coronavirus underscored the reliability of SOEs and sustainability 
of a “socialist market economy” (Tang, 2020). Despite numerous analyst predictions that the 
plan will be ineffectual, Xi continues to defend it. The report from the commission states: 
“State-owned enterprises are an important material and political foundation 
for socialism with Chinese characteristics. They are the key pillar and force 
for the party’s rule and the country’s revitalization… We will improve their 
economic competitiveness, innovation capabilities, their ability to control 
the economy, their influence as well as their capability for control of and 




Mixed Conclusions Around International Treatment of Chinese SOEs 
Within China, the perceived business effects of these types of guidances are largely 
positive, especially from a corporate governance perspective. One study found that the 
impression of CCP surveillance reduced excess compensation of executives and resulted in 
greater efficiency in managing salary expenses (Ma et al., 2013). However, the effects on 
China’s neighbors and recipient countries are less clear. The blatant promotion of CCP goals by 
these companies in the vast majority of cases does not align with the wants of other countries. 
Many states have attempted to limit the activities and influence of wholly private companies due 
to perceived state ties,5 so they are even more wary of SOEs for this reason.  
For instance, the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
published a report recommending Congress to “amend the statute authorizing the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States to bar Chinese state-owned enterprises from acquiring or 
otherwise gaining effective control of U.S. companies.” The recommendation was justified by 
the suspicion that such transactions would allow the SOEs to use “technology, intelligence, and 
market power…in the service of the Chinese state to the detriment of U.S. national security” 
(United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016). If adopted, this 
proposal would shift the way the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS)6 reviews Chinese SOE transactions. CFIUS approved the $43 billion acquisition of 
Syngenta by ChemChina, giving the 100% state-owned company control over major portions of 
the agrichemical supply chain (Copeland, 2016). Historically, CFIUS has also been particularly 
lax with minority-stake SOEs, even if they were acquiring a controlling stake in an American 
 
5 For instance, the Trump administration released announcements of a ban against TikTok earlier in 2020 (Buckley 
and Bradsher, 2020). 
6 CFIUS  
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company (Copeland, 2016). Another instance of hesitancy to deal with CCP-affiliated 
organizations occurred in April 2021. Australia cancelled a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure 
agreement with China’s National Development and Reform Commission (Westcott, 2021; 
Premier of Victoria, 2019). Australia’s foreign affairs minister, Marise Payne, then called the 
deal “inconsistent with Australia’s foreign policy or adverse to [their] foreign relations” 
(Westcott, 2021). 
Not all scholars follow this line of reasoning though. Dr. Wendy Dobson, a Professor 
Emerita of Economic Analysis and Policy at the University of Toronto argues that concerns 
about CCP political and economic influence are “overblown.” She argues that, unexpectedly, 
Chinese SOEs are more transparent than some from other countries, including Canada, so if any, 
more scrutiny should be directed to those countries. By rejecting Chinese SOE investments, 
Canada misses out on opportunities to grow its economy and drive innovation in its energy 
sector especially. Chinese SOEs face no shortage of investment opportunities, so by barring them 
from certain transactions, Canada would be allowing other countries to surpass it. Dobson also 
explains that even if worries of CCP influence are true, they should be weighed against the net 
benefits of the investments and other possible remedies.  
For instance, the activities of the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) serve as a 
case study with favorable results of Chinese SOE involvement in the United States. After Maersk 
Line, a Danish shipping company ended their relationship with the Massachusetts Port Authority, 
COSCO invested in the Port of Boston (Yan, 2012). David Mackey, then-CEO of the 
Massachusetts estimated that this investment saved over 34,000 jobs through the ten-year 
relationship and recognized COSCO for its contribution to the American economy (Yan, 2012). 
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Benefits like these should be weighed against potential consequences before uniformly 
restricting Chinese SOEs from certain transactions (Dobson, 2014).  
 
Defining Project Scope 
For the purposes of this project, the Chinese government will have an ownership stake in 
all the SOEs considered. Roughly, SOEs can be divided into for-profit entities and those that 
provide public services (Guluzade, 2019; Gang and Hope 2013). Only for-profit SOEs with 
international operations and investments from 2005 to 2015—a period that is representative of 
modern Chinese SOEs and their projected growth patterns over the next decade —will be 
considered (Lin et al., 2020). Many Chinese SOEs limit themselves to domestic operations and 
pose interesting questions about the mixing of business and government, however, these entities 
are external to the topic of this project.  
The focus of this project lies within the broader context of considering the overall impact 
of Chinese SOE foreign investment activity. The effects of these actions by Chinese SOEs have 
been analyzed from geopolitical, humanitarian, economic perspectives, and more. This project 
will specifically consider a crucial dimension of economic effects on recipient countries: 
competitiveness. Competitiveness encapsulates many of the concerns from international critics 
described previously, including unfair advantages for SOEs and restrained access to resources 
following transactions.  
Competitiveness in this paper will refer to market competitiveness in the context of 
general equilibrium theory.7 In a perfectly competitive market, all buyers and sellers face the 
 
7 To avoid confusion, the term “economic competitiveness”, although facially equivalent, will not be used in this 
paper. The phrase is widely used as a term of art describing how successful a country or region of the world is at 




same price determined by supply and demand. There exists a seller for every buyer interested in 
a good or service. Sellers cannot charger higher prices because buyers have a plethora of other 
sellers offering virtually indistinguishable items to choose from. No rational buyer would pay 
more for a good when an equal one is available for less. At the same time, sellers cannot charger 
lower prices because that would entail incurring major losses and having to leave the market. 
There is free entry and exit from the market which allows for price adjustments in the long run. 
These theoretical markets are characterized by the availability of choices for interested buyers 
and the lack of price-setting power for sellers. In sum, this equilibrium state “coordinates 
productive effort, balances supply and demand, and leads to an efficient allocation of goods and 
services in the economy” (Levin, 2006).  
The structure of actual markets strays from this ideal in meaningful ways. On the most 
extreme end, a monopoly is the opposite of a perfectly competitive market; there is one producer 
who controls the supply and price of a particular product. A well-known real-world example of a 
monopoly was the De Beers corporation until the early 2000’s. The company owned an 
expansive network of global mines and artificially induced diamond scarcity to increase buyers’ 
willingness to pay for the gems. Following regulatory pressures, the company released its 
monopoly status and has not been able to rebound profits since (Biesheuvel, 2020). Less 
competitive markets facilitate augmented profits for sellers at the expense of buyers. This 
example concerns a non-essential luxury good, but markets for necessities can also stray in this 
 
Competitiveness.aspx#:~:text=Economic%20competitiveness%20i%20n%20the%20context%20of%20comprehensi
ve,that%20bring%20wealth%20into%20a%20community%20or%20region.). The economic competitiveness of the 
United States, for example, would be determined by how efficiently it innovates and produces products that are 
preferred above similar ones made elsewhere. Meanwhile, market competitiveness in this paper is concerned with 
industry level analyses and seller market power dynamics. 
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direction. As markets become less competitive, they move towards these unjust situations where 
corporations wield power over buyers.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1  
Hypothesis 1: The change in an industry’s competitiveness is positively correlated with 
the volume of total investments from Chinese SOEs. Let a low “competitiveness” statistic 
represent a perfectly competitive market and a high one represent a more fragmented, 
concentrated one. Figure 1 depicts the model being tested with this hypothesis.  
Figure 1: Hypothesis 1 Model8 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶 
 
 Investment volume has the potential to drastically shape the competitive landscapes of 
recipient industries in a few ways. First, investments can be directed toward M&A transactions. 
When companies in the same industry combine, they automatically control a larger portion of 
their market. The consumers for the pre-M&A companies are now consumers of one 
amalgamated company, and the new company’s share of the market is greater than each of the 
pre-M&A companies’ shares individually. These transactions can thus result in less competitive 
markets because the large company has fewer competitors and can have more power in setting 
prices, especially if it provides an essential good or service.  
Second, investments can fuel the growth of companies that, willfully or not, create 
anticompetitive environments as a byproduct of their success. For instance, a once common 
strategy used by newly formed companies was to undercut competitors and sustain losses until 
 
8 Let C equal some constant.  
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the new company becomes the dominant player in a market. The incumbent companies may not 
be able to withstand this heightened price competition, allowing the new company to gain market 
share. Although this practice called predatory pricing is regulated against in most developed 
countries, it arguably is still pursued in various sectors including retail and entertainment (Bolton 
et al., 2000; Lecher, 2019). Given the propensity for SOEs to engage in M&A activity and their 
ability to weather significant losses, both explanations for competitive landscape shifts may be at 
play.  
 
Hypothesis 2  
Hypothesis 2: The change in an industry’s competitiveness is positively correlated with 
each Chinese state control variable of SOEs that invested in it. Figure X depicts the model being 
tested with this hypothesis. 
Figure 2: Hypothesis 2 Model 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐶 
 
 The ownership structure of an SOE can affect how decisions are made within the firm. In 
traditional corporations with “control-minority” situations,9 agency problems may arise due to 
misalignment between controlling and minority shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2000). In SOEs, 
the difference in priorities between the state and private, individual stakeholders is even greater 
(Milhaupt and Pargendler, 2017). Without a majority economic interest in a company, the state 
has fewer incentives to pursue financial goals but equivalent power to pursue political ones 
 
9 Control-minority situations occur when minority economic shareholders possess the majority of voting equity in a 
company. This status is also sometimes referred to as “working control.”  
17 
 
(Milhaupt and Pargendler, 2017). Most countries have attempted to avoid this issue by requiring 
equal share ownership to voting rights or by proactively restricting the government’s voting 
rights (Milhaupt and Pargendler, 2017).  A higher government percentage ownership stake in a 
Chinese SOE results in higher economic stakes with their investment decisions and thus could 
result in a greater incentive to promote financial interests which are magnified when the 
remainder of an industry is not competitive.  
 Although SOEs face some tension between political and financial motives, political 
motives in many cases are largely driven by financial ones. Dr. Ritika Passi of the Observer 
Research Foundations analyzed BRI plans and argued that the distinction between economic and 
non-economic motives for SOEs foreign investments can become tenuous. The two cannot be 
disentangled in many cases. She uses infrastructure, the “OBOR’s foundational and most visible 
element as an example (Passi, 2019). Although China arguably has an interest in political 
domination through control of trade routes along the original Silk Road path, these aims are 
fundamentally rooted in its desire for economic growth (Passi, 2019). In cases like these, it is 
reasonable to predict that the state control factors will concurrently result in stronger economic 
effects; the greater the influence of the state, the lower the influence of outside individuals and 
the higher the drive for both profit and power in international politics.  
 The composition and role of boards at SOEs can also influence how investment activity 
occurs in the firm. A strong principle in international SOE governance is maintaining an 
independent board of directors from the government (Milhaupt and Pargendler, 2017). The 
reasoning behind this principle is separating financial motives from political ones. As a result, 
some countries have instituted measures that prevent politicians and regulators from serving on 
boards or limiting the power of board members should government officials be allowed on them. 
18 
 
For instance, Norway bans all civil servants and Brazil bans regulators, politicians, and union 
leaders from serving on the boards of SOEs (Milhaupt and Pargendler, 2017). Chinese SOEs had 
similar regulations prior to the passage of the 2015 guidance, which may have allowed financial 
interests to take precedence in matters of foreign investment (Lu and Zhu, 2020). 
 
Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis 3: An industry’s competitiveness score is positively correlated with the 
volume of total investments when scaled by the level of Chinese state ownership in an enterprise. 
Figure X depicts the model being tested with this hypothesis. 
Figure 3: Hypothesis 3 Model 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐶 
 
 Even if individually, investment volume or Chinese governmental control do not have a 
positive correlation to the concentration of markets, it is possible that the factors considered in 
conjunction do. High investment volumes may not be sufficient to cause a ripple in market 
competitiveness if the CCP has a minimal economic interest in an investing company. In this 
case, the conjunction of investment volume and CCP influence explains the falseness of 
Hypothesis 1. Conversely, high levels of CCP influence in a company may not affect market 
concentration until investments pass a size threshold. Similar to the previous example, a 
correlation may only arise when the two factors are considered together. The conjunction of 
different investment behavior and different CCP interests may be able to explain variation more 






The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures how concentrated an industry is and 
will be used as a proxy for market competitiveness. Market concentration describes how spread-
out market share is among all the firms in an industry. Low market concentration indicates that 
the percentage of revenue generated by each firm is low and approximately equal to the share of 
all other firms. Factors that shift market concentration and market competitiveness include 
corporate consolidation, the regulatory environment, and the ease at which a company can enter 
a market. 
The HHI is the most widely accepted indicator for competitiveness and has been proven 
to be theoretically robust (Rhodes, 1993; Herfindahl, 1950). Countries deploy the HHI 
differently in their considerations, but it is generally considered a standard variable for antitrust 
cases around the world (Rhodes, 1993). For instance, the United States considers M&A activity 
that raises the HHI by two basis points, or 20 points on a scale of 10,000, “likely to enhance 
market power” and thus worthy of thorough investigation prior to approval (The United States 
Department of Justice, 2018). Alternatively, the European Commission merger assessment 
guidelines mainly considers the end size of industries, reading: 
“The Commission is unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in 
a market with a post-merger HHI below 1000. Such markets normally do 
not require extensive analysis. 20. The Commission is also unlikely to 
identify horizontal competition concerns in a merger with a post-merger 
HHI between 1000 and 2000 and a delta below 250, or a merger with a post-
merger HHI above 2000 and a delta below 150, except where special 
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circumstances such as, for instance, one or more of the following factors are 
present: (a) a merger involves a potential entrant or a recent entrant with a 
small market share; (b) one or more merging parties are important 
innovators in ways not reflected in market shares; (c) there are significant 
cross-shareholdings among the market [participants]; (d) one of the merging 
firms is a maverick firm with a high likelihood of disrupting coordinated 
conduct; (e) indications of past or ongoing coordination, or facilitating 
practices, are present; (f) one of the merging parties has a pre-merger market 
share of 50% [or more].” 
 
The HHI sums the squared value of the market share of all firms within an industry with 
a lower score representing a more competitive market (Herfindahl, 1950). Squaring is effective 
because it accurately represents the effect of having firms with little market share without 
altering the effect of a large firms. The figure below describes the formula for calculating HHI. 
Figure 4: HHI Formula10 










Market share will always range between zero and one, inclusive of one but not zero. In a 
monopoly, the single firm’s revenue is equivalent to the sum of all firms’ revenue, so the market 
share equals one. In a perfectly competitive market, market share approaches, but does not equal, 
 
10 Let s represent the market share of x where x is assumed to be a firm. Let the notation ρ(x) represent the gross 
revenue of x. The denominator of the formula for s is also referred to as the market size of a given industry. Across 
market share calculations within the same industry, the market size does not change.  
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zero. Each firm has a negligibly small share of the market that will continue to decrease as more 
firms enter the market. However, the numerator, revenue, definitionally cannot equal zero; 
otherwise, the firm would not be in the industry at all. Because market share never exceeds one 
and neither does the sum of all market shares, HHI will also never exceed one. Intuitively, this 
calculation also reflects shifts in market landscapes. For instance, M&A activity results in one 
company’s original share vanishing and another one’s being augmented, which will result in a 
higher HHI due to the new formula inputs. To show the magnitude of changes more effectively, 




Investment volume will be evaluated on a yearly industry-and-country-level basis with 
USD as its unit. Investment amounts will only include completed deals and be counted in the 
year that the capital was deployed. Because the evaluation period 2005 through 2015 is relatively 
short, investment values will not be adjusted to account for the time value of money. They will 
be presented as the value of the capital at the time of investment. If a transaction had multiple 
investors, it will be assumed that the investors contributed an equal percentage unless otherwise 
indicated in reporting on the deal. Oftentimes when SOEs invest alongside each other or pursue 
joint ventures, they share the burden of capital investment (Grimsditch, 2015). They also tend to 
use same funding sources, so assuming the money was distributed evenly is roughly in 
accordance with this fact (Lin et al., 2020).  
 
 
11 Much literature also begins with the premise of HHI ranging from 0 to 10,000 where the share of a firm 
comprising 20% of an industry would be computed as 20 rather than .2. 
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State Control Factors 
 State control factors will reflect the degree to which the CCP has influence over a 
company. The first factor is the Chinese government’s percentage ownership stake in an SOE. 
Ownership stake affects an SOEs capital structure and the availability of state resources for it 
(Huang et al., 2018; Gang and Hope, 2013). It also directly reflects the level of financial interest 
the government has in an SOE. This metric is a reliable gauge for state control but other factors 
could be relevant as well.  
Even if the government does not own a large stake in an SOE, it can still heavily 
influence the company’s projects and business dealings (Bruton et al., 2015). The second factor, 
supervision over the SASAC, reflects these cases. The main SOEs are operated by the SASAC, 
but the Chinese government does not necessarily hold large stakes in them (Gang and Hope, 
2013; State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, 
n.d.; Scissors, 2020). The SASAC ensures that SOE actions are in alignment with CCP goals, 
and it can play a role in strategizing expansive projects and facilitating engagement with private 
firms (Shen and Galbraith, 2020). The SASAC also provides SOEs additional dividends through 
heightened investments and support through restructuring, allowing them to mirror the strategies 
of global investment banks (Dobson, 2014).  
Lastly, the third factor will be involvement with the BRI. The Xi administration 
characterizes the BRI as “new round of opening to the world” and indicates that they plan to 
heavily direct companies through this globalization effort to best ensure their desired results 
(Cheng et al, 2019). Some companies possess resources, leadership, and networks that are 
valuable for the BRI but otherwise are not of specific interest to the CCP (Cheng et al., 2019). 
Even if a company has a low government ownership stake and is not under SASAC supervision, 
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entrance into a BRI contract entails that for the duration of the project, the company is 
responsible for promoting Beijing’s aims. This variable—whether an investment is associated 
with the BRI—and the presence of SASAC supervision will be treated as indicator variables 
while ownership stake will be treated as numerical or categorical, between majority or minority, 
depending on the model. Additionally, this variable will be evaluated on a transaction-level basis 
while the others are at the company-level.  
 
Additional Variables 
There is conflicting evidence about how greenfield and brownfield investments affect 
economic growth and market composition. An article published in the Review of International 
Economics studied 127 countries over the period 1990 to 2010 and found that greenfield 
investments enhance economic growth while brownfield investments, at best, have no effect on it 
(Harms and Méon, 2017). Conversely, an article from Usak University researchers found that 
both greenfield and brownfield investments enhance economic growth, but greenfield 
investments had a significantly stronger effect (Bayar, 2017). Another study concludes that 
greenfield investments cause a type of “crowding out” effect that deters domestic private 
investment while brownfield investments do not (Ashraf and Herzer, 2014). Regardless, there is 
consensus that greenfield and brownfield investments affect recipient countries in meaningfully 
different ways, so that factor could potentially be relevant in this project and is thus accounted 
for in certain models below. Like the last two variables above, whether an investment is 





Investment data was sourced from the American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) China 
Global Investment Tracker (Scissors, 2020). This dataset includes the individual investments 
made by companies over the period January 2005 through June 2020. Only objective information 
like the company name, government ownership stake, investment volume, and industry of 
operation are included. Derek Scissors, the think tank’s Chief Asia Economist, records the 
completed deals on an approximately quarterly basis. Investments after December 2015 were not 
included for analysis, because there lacks sufficient data about more recent changes in HHI 
globally.  
Industry boundaries were determined by four-digit codes from the 2017 North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS), the most recently published manual (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2017). For less disaggregation, three-digit and two-digit NAICS codes 
were also used. NAICS codes divide industries using their production processes and are updated 
every five years to reflect technological advancements and sector-wide shifts (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2017). The manual demarcates 20 industries with two-digit codes and 
then subclassifications within it using three, four, five, and six-digit codes signaling increased 
specificity (Office of Management and Budget, 2017). 
For each investing company, two measures of state control were recorded: the 
government’s ownership stake in the company and supervision from the SASAC. Government 
ownership stake was listed in the China Global Investment Tracker. Recorded companies were 
crosschecked against the SASAC’s published list of central SOEs to determine the second state 
control factor (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council, n.d.). The transaction-level measure, contract involvement with the BRI, was also 
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pulled from the China Global Investment Tracker and updated, if needed, using reports from 
various media outlets. 
HHI by country was sourced from The World Bank’s TCdata360 initiative HHI Market 
Concentration Index database (The World Bank, 2015). HHI by country was also sourced from 
The World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) HHI Market Concentration Index 
database. HHI by industry was sourced from the US Census Bureau. Every spreadsheet in which 
data was pulled from was compiled into the attached sheet called “intsheets.xlsx”. Then, relevant 
data was cleaned and extracted into the attached final dataset used for analysis, “thesisdata.csv”. 





 As depicted in Figure 5, there was a significant relationship between the total investment 
volume and the change in HHI. However, the effect size was minimal, and the R2 value was very 
small for this model. With the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, it was estimated that for 
every $1 million increase in investments, HHI on the 0 to 10,000 scale increases by .021. This 
increase would represent only .12% of the average one-year HHI change observed and .11% and 
.09% of the two and three-year changes, respectively (Figure 1). Considering the relationships 
under a logistic model revealed an odds ratio (OR) of .0001 (Figure 1). On average, every $1 
million increase in total investment volume increases the probability of a positive HHI change by 
 
12 Appendix 3 contains a complete guide of the types of source data that were compiled to product the final dataset 
for analysis. In the final sheet, formulas for calculating cell values were removed in the interest of reducing storage 
space, so Appendix 4 also contains a detailed replication guide covering the exact steps needed to reproduce the 
attached csv files and results described in this paper.  
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.0001. The low R2 and adjusted R2 indicate that describing the total investments alone does not 
account for much variation in the data, and more variables are needed to fully describe the cause 
for HHI changes. 
Figure 5: Hypothesis 1 Model Results13 
 
 
These conclusions are supported by the difference in means for one-year, two-year, and 
three-year HHI changes. Total investments tend to be higher in cases when HHI increased but 
not by much. In the two-year time frame, the average difference in total investments between 
 
13 Tables were formatted using the R package “stargazer” (see Hlavac, M. (2018). stargazer: Well-Formatted 




cases where HHI increased and cases where HHI decreased was less than $3 million, a small 
fraction of the total outward investment in any given year (Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Yearly Average Total Investments by Time Period and HHI Change 
 
Given overall average total investments of 954.6012 and a standard deviation of 1393.2550, a Z-
test for the difference in means revealed that the differences are not significant under typical 
norms for p-values.14 Although a difference is depicted in Figure 6, it cannot be solely 
attributable to different investment volumes.  
 
14 The number of observations was 514. One-sided tests were assumed. The results of the Z-Test were calculated as 
follows:  
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 The average ownership stake in a Chinese SOE proved to be a significant predictor of 
HHI changes, but none of the other variables describing state influence were not. Adding the 
SASAC and BRI variables did not improve the R2 values from Model 1 in Figure 7 on the next 
page, meaning the additional state control factors did not assist in explaining the variation in the 
data. SASAC supervision had a negative coefficient, which would have indicated that the 
investments of SOEs under SASAC supervision had a beneficial effect on market concentration. 
This finding would have been completely contrary to the predictions in Hypothesis 2, but the 
variable was not significant.  
  
 









 = .28. 1- 
Z(.28) = .3897. 









  = -.39 
Z(-.39) = .3483. 
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Figure 7: Hypothesis 2 Model Results 
 
 
 It was then explored if separating the average stake variable into minority and majority 
would yield important results. Reconsidering the average Chinese government stake as a 
categorical variable—minority if it was less than or equal to 50% and majority if it was greater 
than 50%—revealed noticeable differences (Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10). The majority stake 
transactions, on average, resulted in larger changes in HHI than the remainder of the population, 




Figure 8: Overall Change in HHI 
 
Figure 9: Change in HHI for Majority Stake Transactions 
 
Figure 10: Change in HHI for Minority Stake Transactions 
 
Using a Z-Test to examine if the difference in means between these three samples is significant, 
it was found that the significance levels ranged between .1170 and .3483.15 There was a larger 
 
15 One-sided tests were assumed. The results of the Z-Test were calculated as follows:  









 = .44. 1- Z(.44) = .3300. 









 = .39. 1- Z(.39) = .3483. 









 = .77. 1- Z(.77) = .2206. 
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normalized difference between the minority stake sample and the overall sample, as compared to 
with the majority stake sample. The p-values from these statistics are not small enough to 
definitively conclude that the majority or minority stake transactions are significantly different 
from the holistic average.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
 The models tested for Hypothesis 3 follow the Hypothesis 2 findings that state control 
factors besides average stake are not significant predictors of HHI changes (Figure 11).  In each 
model with the additional features added, they were not significant and did not improve both the 
R2  and adjusted R2 values. Although R2  and adjusted R2 values were higher than in the previous 
models, they were still very small, so another model factoring in the starting HHI was tested.   
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 Figure 12 depicts the revised model being tested for Hypothesis 3.  
Figure 12: Revised Hypothesis 3 Model 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝐼0 +  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐶 
This model tests the same variables as before but attempts to remove some of the fluctuations 
based on starting HHI and is instead attempting to predict the ending HHI. Starting HHI may 
affect how much HHI can change within the period. A more concentrated market may be capable 
of larger shifts in HHI because a single merger or acquisition would sweep a larger share of the 
industry’s existing firms. Figure 13 on the next page depicts the results from testing this model. 
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Figure 13: Hypothesis 3 Revised Model Results 
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The revised model produced substantially higher R2  and adjusted R2 values without 
reaching the point of overspecification (Figure 13). The overall R2  values in these models 
increased substantially after considering starting HHI. Starting HHI, total investment volume, 
and average stake were significant predictors at the .1 confidence level. However, the state 
control factors besides average stake remained non-significant. These results mirror the 
Hypothesis 2 findings that state control factors besides average stake are not significant 
predictors of HHI changes (Figure 13).  None of the cases with the additional features showed 
improvement for both R2  and adjusted R2 values, indicating that changes in R2 were offset by 
adjusted R2 penalties for incorporating additional variables. Of the tested models, this one proved 
the most effective but parsimonious at predicting HHI changes (Figure 13).  
 
Discussion 
Congruence with Prior Literature 
 The findings from this project are consistent with journalistic descriptions of the 
investment strategies deployed by Chinese SOEs. Chinese companies in general historically tend 
to prefer inorganic growth through the acquisition of strategic assets, both physical and 
intangible (Deng, 2009). SOEs adopted this disposition, resulting in high profile deals that raised 
the suspicion of antitrust governance bodies. For instance, Zoomlion, the six largest construction 
machinery company in the world and the largest in China, acquired Compagnia Italiana Forme 
Acciaio (CIFA) and Powermole in 2008 and 2000, outbidding other interested companies (High, 
2008). These companies were Zoomlion’s rivals in Italy and the United Kingdom, respectively, 
and each was a dominant player on the global scale (High, 2008). Instead of attempting to 
outcompete them, Zoomlion relied on highly leveraged transactions to eliminate its challengers 
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and continues to pursue that approach today (O’Connor, 2018). In 2016, the company submitted 
a bid to purchase its US-based rival, Terex, despite already having debt over 43 times its 
earnings for the year (O’Connor, 2018). The bid was ultimately unsuccessful, but the sheer 
volume of transactions should continue to give pause to regulatory officials considering future 
SOE deals. 
The negative coefficients for SASAC supervision could be explained by the additional 
levels of supervision from provincial and local governments that some SOEs must abide under 
(Heng, 2014). Provincial and local governments are significantly less concerned with 
international geopolitics and significantly more concerned with SOEs ability to provide local 
services (Heng, 2014). Furthermore, the extensive reporting guidelines and additional layers of 
middle management for SASAC SOEs may reduce their operational efficiency (Lu and Zhu, 
2020). These superfluous instances of bureaucracy, among others, could result in SASAC SOEs 
being less agile in executing the investment strategies of other SOEs (Milhaupt and Pargendler, 
2017). 
 
Limitations of Findings 
Like all indicators, the HHI is not always a perfect reflection of what it was designed to 
measure. The “relevant market fallacy” can occur when evaluating any transaction (Young, 
2009). HHI computations can be based upon both infinitely specified industries to meaninglessly 
broad ones and still be valid mathematically (Young, 2009). For instance, a soft drink company 
could be considered in its specific flavored beverage industry within its town and nutritional 
classification, i.e. zero-sugar orange sodas in Round Rock, Texas. On the other side of the 
spectrum, the company could be considered within the industry of all liquids. Both conceptions 
are nonsensical and render the indicator useless. If the company were considering a merger, the 
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first classification would yield an astronomically large post-transaction HHI, even if both the 
buyer and target were small companies. The latter grouping would produce a very modest HHI 
figure, even if the two companies were multinational corporations. No specific guidelines exist 
for drawing industry boundaries for HHI calculations, so good-faith mistakes can also occur. 
Because of the leeway here, HHI will also vary naturally depending on the person examining it. 
Considering multiple sources and using a tiebreaker, if necessary, may be an effective way to 
reduce the impact of individual biases. 
Additionally, critics argue that the HHI does not sufficiently weight consumer utility, for 
instance, when handling exceptions where one large company is better able to provide services 
for their needs (Roberts, 2014). If a credit card company can only reach nationwide acceptance 
by merchants after a series of mergers, consumers would clearly prefer that to having multiple 
credit cards even if it entailed higher fees (Roberts, 2014). In a situation where one company 
services half of all merchants and another services the other half, their merger may significantly 
enhance the proforma company’s market power. The United States Federal Trade Commission 
would likely cancel this deal even though would it provide an enhanced service and contribute to 
consumer welfare. Toby Roberts, a staff attorney at the California Court of Appeals, proposes 
incorporating network effects and other drivers of customer satisfaction into a more holistic 
M&A evaluation framework. 
 
Robustness Tests for Competition 
For additional robustness checks on these findings, results could be measured in terms of 
changes in average price-cost margins (PCMs) and augmented relative profit differences 
(ARPDs) across industries. All are alternative measures of market competitiveness with 
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significant economic and mathematic backings. Each one captures aspects of competition absent 
from the HHI formula but, on their own, are not rigorous enough justify complete conclusions. 
With the HHI, they can paint a more comprehensive picture of an industry’s competitive 
landscape.  
The PCM represents the difference between the price and marginal cost of an item, and it 
can be calculated by reviewing line items on balance sheets and income statements (Amador et 
al., 2015). In congruence with the theory of perfectly competitive markets, lower PCM and lower 
overall profitability is characteristic of more competitive markets. An upward trend in the 
average PCM reflects an increase in market power wielded by the average player in an industry 
(Amador et al., 2015). A declining average PCM reflects a market becoming more competitive 
(Amador et al., 2015). In addition to describing shifts in market competition, research has shown 
that changes in average PCMs can also predict sensitivity to market shocks and financial crises 
(Görg and  Warzynski, 2006; Amador et al., 2015). However, the PCM has not been proven 
theoretically robust. Contrary to predictions, in certain cases,16 increasing competition can result 
in an industry’s PCM increasing (Amir, 2003).  
The ARPD is a modified version of the Boone Indicator or relative profit difference 
(RPD), which was proven to be more robust measure for market competition than the PCM 
(Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010; Ansari, 2012; Boone, 2008). The RPD formula is as 
follows (Boone, 2008): 
  
 
16 The case described in this study was a simulated Cournot industry with increasing entrants that had different cost 
structures. A Cournot industry is a duopolistic one where firms produce homogenous products and choose quantity 
to produce simultaneously (see Cournot, A. A. & Fisher, Irving. (1929). Researches Into the Mathematical 
Principles of the Theory of Wealth. New York: Macmillan Company). 
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Figure 14: RPD Formula17 
RPD =
π(typical firm) − π(least efficient firm)
π(most efficient firm) −  π(least efficient firm)
 
Under this logic, the higher the RPD, the more competitive a market; in a perfectly competitive 
market there are minimal differences between the profit of the most efficient and least efficient 
firms. Boone analyzed the banking industry and rationalized that competition boosts the profits 
of more efficient banks while destroying those of less efficient ones, thus causing them to exit 
(Boone, 2008).  
However, the RPD does not account for firm size and thus the volume of innovation, 
which can lead to a misleadingly small RPD in broad sectors like manufacturing (Leuvensteijn et 
al., 2007; Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010). The ARPD resolves that problem by dividing 
the profit terms in the original RPD equation by the gross revenue for a given period (Schiersch 
and Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010): 













Although the ARPD has been proven theoretically robust, there have been minimal explorations 
or tests of it outside of Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke’s work (Ansari, 2012). Until further 
applications of this indicator are explored, it should not be used authoritatively but rather in 
comparison or conjunction with other indicators.  
 
17 Let the notation π(x) represent the profit of x where x is assumed to be a firm. 
18 Let the notation ρ(x) represent the gross revenue of x where x is assumed to be a firm. 
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Should the results from either additional test not reinforce the HHI findings, a 
reevaluation of the conclusions from this project may the necessary. The mismatch between 
HHI, PCM, and ARPD could stem from differences in the measures themselves. Although the 
factors are attempting to reflect the same concept, their calculations are vastly different. One 
factor might be including metrics not relevant to the others or vice versa. Nonetheless, a 
mismatch could also indicate reasonable conflicting conclusions about the overall effect on 
market concentration. In such cases, the data and analyses would need to be reexamined to 
pinpoint the drivers of the inconsistencies between the statistics. Afterward, it would be 
worthwhile to discuss what these drivers reveal about different dimensions of market 
competition. 
 
Robustness Tests for State Control 
 Different variables measuring the depth of CCP state influence could also be explored to 
test the validity of this paper’s results. Additional factors could include the use of government 
resources, historical minimum Chinese government ownership stake, and the proportion of debt 
owed to Chinese government-affiliated entities versus wholly private ones. These variables, 
although not publicly available and difficult to compile, would explore different dimensions of 
influence that the CCP has on companies. A company that relies on conditional subsidies and 
uses SASAC directors as management consultants is retrained in its ability to pursue interests 
independent of the CCP. A company where the Chinese government has always held a majority 
stake has always had operations framed around state interests. Conversely, companies where that 
condition does not hold have had operations pursuing independent financial goals. A company 
that holds looming debt obligations to the Chinese government has a greater interest in 
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maximizing its cash flows to pay it off. It also has incentives to cater to CCP directors in hopes 
of receiving favorable refinancing rates or debt forgiveness. These companies may act in 
meaningfully different ways from those that do not rely on governmental support, did not 
originate with a large government ownership stake, and do not hold outstanding debts to the 
Chinese government adjacent lenders. Two of the three state control factors proved insignificant 




 Continuations of this line of research could include investigating other financial metrics 
that reflect the health of an industry. Possible dependent variables could include average leverage 
ratios, capital intensity, multiples in M&A transactions, and the average return on assets. These 
metrics reflect themes in general equilibrium theory, like the ease of entry and exit into a market. 
If an industry’s average leverage ratio is trending upwards, it likely is becoming more difficult to 
enter, as newcomers would likely need to assume more debt to survive. Conversely, if an 
industry’s capital intensity is trending upwards, it likely is becoming more difficult to exit, as 
fixed assets tend to be attached to longer-term contracts.  
 Additionally, specific transactions completed by Chinese SOEs could be evaluated to see 
if they were worthwhile. SOEs’ access to higher amounts of capital and capacity to hold debt 
allow them to pay otherwise absurd prices for acquisitions. Many bids and deals closed are 
arguably attempts for China to strengthen its claim to strategic resources or territories, like the 
South China Sea. The value of these potential geopolitical gains could be calculated with 
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consideration of contingent scenarios and compared to the expenses incurred with associated 
transactions.  
 
Potential Applications of Findings 
This paper’s findings and analogous ones could be used for recommendations to 
investment promotion agencies against supporting Chinese SOE transactions. However, they 
could also be used for regulatory bodies, like the Federal Trade Commission, to create 
environments that minimize the harms of SOE investments and allow for recipient countries to 
enjoy the economic growth associated with them. Dobson, who encourages China SOE 
investments into Canada, reasons that any negative effects of these transactions could be 
resolved with increased regulatory oversight and devising consequences for noncompliance. 
Instead of outright restricting SOEs, their activities could be monitored from various standpoints 
including transparency and security (Dobson, 2014). Decisions to halt mergers could also not be 
bound to company size thresholds or other related metrics, so specific cautionary measures can 
be applied to SOEs (Young, 2009; Cheng et al., 2019). 
One example of a targeted rule is the antitrust-related standard for Chinese SOEs that was 
devised by the European Commission19 in 2016. Upon announcement of the potential joint 
venture between China General Nuclear Power (CGN) and Électricité de France (EDF), the 
Commission deemed it necessary to examine Chinese energy sector SOEs as a collective (Price, 
2016). Instead of considering SOE transactions on the basis of individual companies, they can 
consider all SOEs in the same country and industry together. The sentiments of this move 
underly the results of this project. Because Chinese SOEs in the same sector jointly promote the 
 
19 The European Commission is the governing body that oversees antitrust issues within the EU.  
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same interests and benefit many of the same actors, they ought to be treated as one entity when 
considering antitrust issues. The shifts in market concentration are not dependent on the size or 
capabilities of each company individually but rather the combined presence of all Chinese SOEs 
in a given industry. At the very least, this regulatory change presents another obstacle for SOEs 
considering M&A transactions. Viewing Chinese SOEs as a class rather than individuals disarms 
the previously effective strategy of spreading investments across multiple CCP-controlled 
corporations. Although the CGN-EDF deal was eventually approved, Dr. Alan Riley of the 
Institute for Statecraft and Nicholas French, head of the China antitrust practice at Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, predict that this framework shift foreshadows tightening rules to come 
(Price, 2016).  
 
Conclusion 
Chinese SOEs rely on foreign operations and investments to secure income and promote 
Beijing’s policy goals. Encoded in their functioning is allegiance to the CCP, and as such, the 
companies act collectively to maximize its profits and international influence. Over six decades, 
the companies shifted their focus from domestic services to foreign opportunities under market 
reforms implemented by different administrations. The current SOE expansion strategy uniquely 
utilizes M&A transactions instead of organic growth to expedite their rise to dominance and 
preemptively remove rivals within an industry. As China embarks on the BRI, with SOEs 
primarily leading the way, the historical economic effects of SOE investments should not be 
overlooked. 
This project quantitatively tested one aspect of the notion that Chinese SOEs and the 
government entities behind them cause problematic results when they expand internationally. 
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The results of this paper support initiatives to further regulate the M&A activity of Chinese 
SOEs and limit their presence in the global economy. It found that foreign investments of 
Chinese SOEs tend to significantly increase market concentration in recipient industries based on 
the size of their commitments and the strength of CCP influence on a company. Both numerical 
figures and descriptive accounts illustrate how the investment strategies of Chinese SOEs can 
create less competitive markets. The structure of markets reflects dynamics between consumers, 
corporations, and governments, and it is crucial to protect for the promotion of societal wellbeing 
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Appendix 1: Glossary of Acronyms 
a. ARPD – Augmented relative profit difference. The ARPD is a weighted measure of 
market competition that adjusts the RPD of an industry based on the gross revenue of 
relevant firms (Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010). See Appendix 1g for explanation 
of the RPD. Refer to Figure 15 and its associated paragraphs for more details and 
calculations about the ARPD. 
b. BRI – Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative is a multi-trillion-dollar 
global infrastructure project that the Chinese government announced in 2013.  
c. CCP – Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party is the governing 
political party in China and faces no significant institutional opposition.  
d. HHI – Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Refer to Figure 3 and its associated paragraphs for 
more details and calculations about the HHI. 
e. M&A – Mergers and acquisitions. Mergers occur when two companies decide to 
combine into one. Acquisitions occur when one company wants to purchase another 
company either to subsume it or to establish it as a subsidiary. 
f. NAICS – North American Industry Classification System. NAICS is the industry 
classification system used by the United States, Canada, and Mexico (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2017). It groups like businesses together based on their 
production processes and assigns codes to each group with increasing specificity as more 
digits are added (Office of Management and Budget, 2017). 




h. PCM – Price-cost margin. The PCM is the difference between the price and marginal cost 
of a good or service (Amador et al., 2015). Changes in the average PCM of an industry 
are used to describe changes in its competitive landscape. A lower PCM represents higher 
competition while a higher PCM represents the opposite. 
i. RPD – Relative profit difference. The RPD is a measure of how competitive a market is 
based on the profits of the least, average, and most efficient companies within an industry 
(Boone, 2008). Refer to Figure 14 and its associated paragraph for more details and 
calculations. 
j. SASAC – State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. The State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission is an agency within China’s 
State Council that oversees the operations of 97 most central SOEs. 
k. SOE – State-owned enterprise. State-owned enterprises are companies that are partially 
or wholly operated or owned by a national, provincial, or local government.  
 
Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms 
a. Brownfield – For brownfield investments, a company purchases access to existing 
facilities in a foreign country to launch its expansion into it.  
b. Greenfield – For greenfield investments, a company builds its facilities from the ground 
up without using on preexisting fixed assets of other companies.  
c. Market competitiveness – Market competitiveness in general equilibrium theory refers to 
the quality of a market to 1) naturally produce one prevailing price that constrains all 
sellers of a product and 2) satisfy all buyer demand at that prevailing price. Market 
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concentration is associated with market competitiveness, because it relates to the amount 
of companies competing in an industry.  
 
Appendix 3: Complete Explanation of Source Data 
The file titled “intsheets” was created to centralize all the sheets the final dataset would 
reference.35 The following sheets in order were added to this file in individual tabs:  
• naics: Contains four-digit, three-digit, and two-digit NAICS codes for relevant 
industries (Office of Management and Budget, 2017). The four-digit codes were 
manually entered, but the three-digit and two-digit ones were calculated using the 
formulas LEFT(B2, 3) and LEFT(C2, 3), respectively.  
• cmpnycode: Contains an ascending numeric code for relevant companies. 
Companies were copied from the invdata sheet, duplicates were removed, and the 
remaining cells were sorted alphabetically and given incrementing codes 
beginning with 1. This sheet also contains data for the government ownership 
stake at the time of investment and the presence of SASAC supervision. This data 
accumulated from multiple sources with the latter two columns being filled in 
manually. 
• sasac: Contains a list of central SOEs that are supervised by SASAC, including 
both the Chinese names and the English translation (State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, n.d.).  
• invdata: Contains a copy of the China Global Investment Tracker (Scissors, 
2020). The columns with multiple stakes or companies were divided into multiple 
 
35 The title was intended to be a shorthand for “Intermediate Sheets.” 
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rows, and their collective investment was assumed to be split equally unless 
available information stated otherwise. Additionally, the blank subsector sells 
were populated with the sector in the column directly to the left. Lastly, one edit 
was made to further specify the industries being invested in. In 2014, one 
investment into Canada was categorized as “Other” in its industry subsector. For 
accuracy, the industry was changed to “Advertising” because the investing 
company was BlueFocus Communication Group, one of the top public relations 
companies in Asia (Forbes, n.d.). 
• hhi-tc: Contains a copy of the HH Market Concentration Index created by 
TCdata360 (The World Bank, n.d.).36 
• hhi-wits: Contains a copy of the HHI data compiled for the WITS database (The 
World Bank, n.d.). 
• ctrycode: Contains an ascending numeric code for relevant countries. Countries 
were copied from the invdata sheet, duplicates were removed, and the remaining 
cells were sorted alphabetically and given incrementing codes beginning with 1.  
 
Appendix 4: Complete Explanation of Data Cleaning and Analysis 
Coding for R with comments can be found in the attached files. Formulas in each csv file 
were removed and replaced with the text of their values to reduce file sizes. The instructions 
below describe how to recreate the final csv file used for analysis. 
 
36 This HHI data was eventually replaced with the data from WITS. As such, it is not necessary to include in the 
intsheets file if desired.  
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To replicate the “thesisdata” csv file, first, filter out the blank cells in Column E (“Share 
Size”), and copy the country, subsector,37 and year columns from the invdata tabs in intsheets. 
Delete values where the year is greater than 2015. Use the following formulas to then add the 
four-digit, three-digit, and two-digit NAICS codes, respectively, for the industries: 
• naics4: INDEX ( [intsheets.xlsx] NAICS! $B$2 : $B$36, MATCH (B2, [intsheets.xlsx] 
NAICS! $A$2: $A$36, 0) )38 
• naics3: INDEX ( [intsheets.xlsx] NAICS! $C$2 : $C$36, MATCH (B2, [intsheets.xlsx] 
NAICS! $A$2: $A$36, 0) ) 
• naics2: INDEX ( [intsheets.xlsx] NAICS! $D$2 : $D$36, MATCH (B2, [intsheets.xlsx] 
NAICS! $A$2: $A$36, 0) ) 
Highlight the country, industry, and four-digit NAICS code columns, and use the remove 
duplicates Excel function to keep only the unique combinations. At this point, there should 515 
rows, including the title row, remaining. 
The following table describes the thesisdata column names and the remaining steps for 
replicating it using intsheets and Excel formulas. Columns are listed in the left-to-right order 
they appear in the final sheet.  
Figure 16: Replication Table for thesisdata.csv 
 
37 This value was used instead of sector to describe an industry because it allowed for a higher level of 
disaggregation that could be reversed if needed. 




Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
id The unique value that 
represents the row being 
used. It is created from the 
concatenation of a four-digit 




ctrycode The corresponding country 
code from the ctrycode page 
in the intsheets file.  
INDEX ( ' [intsheets.xlsx] 
ctrycode'! $B$2: $B$125, 
MATCH(B2,'[intsheets.xlsx]c
trycode'!$A$2:$A$125,0))41 
naics4 Explained above. Explained above. 
naics3 Explained above. Explained above. 
naics2 Explained above. Explained above. 
 
39 This process can be replaced with concatenating the industry name, country, and year. Codes were used to 
minimize the influence of preconceptions when initially interpreting the data. 
40 For this formula, “ctrycode” was in Column C, “naics4” was in Column F, and “year” was in column E of 
thesisdata. 
41 For this formula, Column B of thesisdata had the list of countries created at the beginning.  
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Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
num_cmpny The number of companies 
that invested in a given 
country, industry, and year 
COUNTIFS('[intsheets.xlsx] 




$H$5: $H$1701, "="&D2, 
'[intsheets.xlsx] invdata'! 
$E$5: $E$1701, ">"&0) 
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Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny1 The company code of the first 
company listed in the invdata 
table that invested in the 
corresponding country and 
industry during the 
corresponding year. 
The “id” column is first 
added as the first column in 
the invdata sheet in intsheets 







Then in the thesisdata file, 










Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny1_inv The amount in millions of 
dollars that Company 1 
invested in this country, 




cmpny1_stake The Chinese government’s 
current percent equity stake 




cmpny1_sasac Whether Company 1 is 
supervised by SASAC. The 
value is “1” if they are and 




cmpny1_bri Whether this investment by 
Company 1 was involved 
with the BRI. The value is 







cmpny1_grnfld Whether the Company 1 
investment was a greenfield 
investment. The value is “1” 






Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny2 The second company listed in 
the invdata table that invested 
in the corresponding country 
and industry during the 
corresponding year. Cells are 
blank if there is no second 
company. 
Filter out rows where 
num_cmpny equals 1. Use the 
following formula beginning 
with the first entry, which 















Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny2_inv The amount in millions of 
dollars that Company 2 
invested in this country, 
industry, and year. Cells are 











cmpny2_stake The Chinese government’s 
current percent equity stake 
in Company 2. Cells are 












42 The brackets indicate an array formula. Array formulas must be applied using Ctrl+Shift+Enter. The “+” used in 
commands here indicates a need to hold down the two keys simultaneously. Meanwhile, the “-“, if used, indicates 
that the buttons should be pressed in succession, not at the same time. 
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Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny2_sasac Whether Company 2 is 
supervised by SASAC. The 
value is “1” if they are and 




cmpny2_bri Whether this investment by 
Company 2 was involved 
with the BRI. The value is 
“1” if it was and “0” if it was 
not. Cells are blank if there is 










cmpny2_grnfld Whether the Company 2 
investment was a greenfield 
investment. The value is “1” 
if it was and “0” if it was not. 













Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny3 The third company listed in 
the invdata table that invested 
in the corresponding country 
and industry during the 
corresponding year. Cells are 
blank if there is no third 
company. 
Filter out rows where 
num_cmpny equals 1 or 2. 
Use the following formula 
beginning with the first entry, 
















Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny3_inv The amount in millions of 
dollars that Company 3 
invested in this country, 
industry, and year. Cells are 











cmpny3_stake The Chinese government’s 
current percent equity stake 
in Company 3. Cells are 











cmpny3_sasac Whether Company 3 is 
supervised by SASAC. The 
value is “1” if they are and 






Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny3_bri Whether this investment by 
Company 3 was involved 
with the BRI. The value is 
“1” if it was and “0” if it was 
not. Cells are blank if there is 










cmpny3_grnfld Whether the Company 3 
investment was a greenfield 
investment. The value is “1” 
if it was and “0” if it was not. 













Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny4 The fourth company listed in 
the invdata table that invested 
in the corresponding country 
and industry during the 
corresponding year. Cells are 
blank if there is no fourth 
company. 
Filter out rows where 
num_cmpny equals 1, 2, or 3. 
Use the following formula 
beginning with the first entry, 
















Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny4_inv The amount in millions of 
dollars that Company 4 
invested in this country, 
industry, and year. Cells are 











cmpny4_stake The Chinese government’s 
current percent equity stake 
in Company 4. Cells are 











cmpny4_sasac Whether Company 4 is 
supervised by SASAC. The 
value is “1” if they are and 






Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny4_bri Whether this investment by 
Company 4 was involved 
with the BRI. The value is 
“1” if it was and “0” if it was 
not. Cells are blank if there is 










cmpny4_grnfld Whether the Company 4 
investment was a greenfield 
investment. The value is “1” 
if it was and “0” if it was not. 













Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny5 The fifth company listed in 
the invdata table that invested 
in the corresponding country 
and industry during the 
corresponding year. Cells are 
blank if there is no fifth 
company. 
Filter out rows where 
num_cmpny equals 1, 2, 3, or 
4. Use the following formula 
beginning with the first entry, 
















Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny5_inv The amount in millions of 
dollars that Company 5 
invested in this country, 
industry, and year. Cells are 











cmpny5_stake The Chinese government’s 
current percent equity stake 
in Company 5. Cells are 











cmpny5_sasac Whether Company 5 is 
supervised by SASAC. The 
value is “1” if they are and 






Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny5_bri Whether this investment by 
Company 5 was involved 
with the BRI. The value is 
“1” if it was and “0” if it was 
not. Cells are blank if there is 










cmpny5_grnfld Whether the Company 5 
investment was a greenfield 
investment. The value is “1” 
if it was and “0” if it was not. 













Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny6 The sixth company listed in 
the invdata table that invested 
in the corresponding country 
and industry during the 
corresponding year. Cells are 
blank if there is no sixth 
company. 
Filter out rows where 
num_cmpny equals 1, 2, 3, or 
4.43 Use the following 
formula beginning with the 
first entry, which should be 















43 No rows have exactly five companies. 
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Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny6_inv The amount in millions of 
dollars that Company 6 
invested in this country, 
industry, and year. Cells are 











cmpny6_stake The Chinese government’s 
current percent equity stake 
in Company 6. Cells are 











cmpny6_sasac Whether Company 6 is 
supervised by SASAC. The 
value is “1” if they are and 






Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
cmpny6_bri Whether this investment by 
Company 6 was involved 
with the BRI. The value is 
“1” if it was and “0” if it was 
not. Cells are blank if there is 










cmpny6_grnfld Whether the Company 6 
investment was a greenfield 
investment. The value is “1” 
if it was and “0” if it was not. 











total_inv The total amount of 
investments in millions that 
were received in an industry 





Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 
avgstake Simple average of the 
government ownership stakes 
in the investing companies 
for the evaluation period 
AVERAGE(O2,U2,AA2, 
AG2,AM2,AS2) 
w_avgstake Weighted average of the 
government ownership stakes 
based on the investment sizes 
















1yr_hhichange HHI change over one year BD2-BC2 
1yr_hhichange_bin Whether HHI increased in 
one year. The value is “1” if 






Column Name (Letter) Data Stored Excel Formula 






2yr_hhichange HHI change over two years BG2-BD2 
2yr_hhichange_bin Whether HHI increased in 
two years. The value is “1” if 










3yr_hhichange HHI change over three years BJ2-BG2 
3yr_hhichange_bin Whether HHI increased in 
one year. The value is “1” if 




In the interest of reducing storage space and improving processing times, use the Ctrl+A 
command and then the Alt-H-V-V command to copy the entire sheet and only retain its values 
with no formulas. Out of convention, the industry and country columns first created were deleted 




Appendix 5: Compilation of Figures 
a. Figure 1: Hypothesis 1 Model 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶 
 
b. Figure 2: Hypothesis 2 Model 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐶 
 
c. Figure 3: Hypothesis 3 Model 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + ∑ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐶 
 
d. Figure 4: HHI Formula 

















f. Figure 6: Yearly Average Total Investments by Time Period and HHI Change 
 
 




h. Figure 8: Overall Change in HHI 
 
 










k. Figure 11: Hypothesis 3 Model Results 
86 
 
l. Figure 12: Revised Hypothesis 3 Model 




m. Figure 13: Hypothesis 3 Models Continued 
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n. Figure 14: RPD Formula 
RPD =
π(typical firm) − π(least efficient firm)
π(most efficient firm) −  π(least efficient firm)
 
 














p. See Appendix 2 above for Figure X: Replication Table for thesisdata.csv. 
 
 
 
